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Summary
Based on a case study of water management in
the Kirindi Oya Irrigation and Settlement Project
(KOISP) in southern Sri Lanka, this report
describes the constraints in seasonal scheduling
of water allocations from relatively small
reservoirs that were not designed to carry storage
from one season to the next. Predicting reservoir
inflow is complicated because of annual variations
in the beginning and end of the rainy season, as
well as the amount of seasonal rainfall.
In the case of KOISP, irrigation scheduling is
confounded by changes in the catchment that
have resulted in periodic water scarcity. These
changes have occurred since 1986 when the
Lunugamwehera reservoir started operations and
large-scale migration of settlers in the upstream
catchment increased the local water demand. As
a result, estimated average annual inflow into the
reservoir started to decline. The problems are
most acute during periods of low rainfall, for
instance, during the 1992 yala (dry season from
April to September) and the 1999 yala.
Crops failed completely during the 1992 yala,
except in one part of KOISP served by a
separate reservoir (Wirawila tank). This resulted
from the fact that farmers had planted paddy in
the entire Ellegala Irrigation System (EIS) in spite
of warnings from the Irrigation Department (ID)
that water levels in the reservoir were low.
Reservoir inflow during the season was also
lower than expected.
Stakeholder participation and farmers’
acceptance of advice from the ID had improved
much in the 1999 yala. This season’s crop
production was successful, although rainfall was
much below average. This can be attributed to
rotational operation of the system, but especially
to greater cooperation from Distributary Channel
Organization (DCO) leaders, ID staff and
representatives of the farmer organizations (FOs).
On the basis of the experience gained in the
1999 yala, members of the ID staff now argue
that the yala inflow in years with water scarcity
should not be taken into account when planning
the yala cropping, but kept instead in reserve in
the reservoir for a timely start of the following
maha (wet season from October to March)
cropping.
The farmers have learned to be more
disciplined in their water use, and to value the
reuse of drainage water, which was earlier not
considered suitable for irrigation. It was found that
farmers in the EIS, who have clayey or clay-loam
soils may actually have higher yields in water-
scarce years than in normal years. Further
investigation is needed to determine the exact
reason. Interestingly, most farmers who had high
yields in the 1998 yala had even higher yields in
the 1999 yala, although the average yields of
1999 were much lower than those of the previous
year. Most farmers growing high-yielding varieties
are located in the EIS. Farmers located in the
Right Bank (RB) were especially affected by
water scarcity at all stages of crop growth.
Apparently, inequity in water distribution, due both
to location within the system and to head-tail
differences along canals, is exacerbated during
dry years.1
Water Scarcity and Managing Seasonal Water
Crisis: Lessons from the Kirindi Oya Project
in Sri Lanka
R. Sakthivadivel, Ronald Loeve, Upali A. Amarasinghe and Manju Hemakumara
Introduction
In the semiarid tropics, variation in annual
rainfall is very high and the variation in monthly
rainfall from year to year is even higher
(Sanchez 1976). The onset and withdrawal of
monsoon also vary from year to year making it
difficult to predict reservoir inflow. Much of the
rainfall is concentrated within 3 to 4 months of
a year when a major part of the reservoir inflow
takes place. Dry weather flow during the non-
rainy season is considerably less with a high
variability in flow. The uncertainties involved in
predicting the quantum and timing of these
rainfall and flow events make seasonal planing
of irrigation scheduling cumbersome, especially
when reservoirs are not designed and operated
for carryover storage.
Two of the dominant factors used in
seasonal planning are probable monthly or
seasonal flow and the storage available at the
time of planning. The long-term inflow data are
used in estimating probable flow. However, in
many irrigation systems, the long-term reservoir
inflow and its pattern have drastically changed
due to upstream watershed development caused
by rapid demographic changes. Non-updating of
the inflow data periodically to account for these
changes leads to erroneous estimation of
reservoir inflow, making seasonal planning
uncertain. Short-term (monthly or fortnightly)
forecasting procedures do not exist in most
Asian irrigation systems, and even if they do,
they are not updated to account for upstream
changes, hindering the reliable estimation of
reservoir flow.
On many occasions, for one reason or
another, farmers do not follow the seasonal
scheduling decisions that the Project Managers
have taken and announced. Farmers also often
violate these decisions by increasing the extent
of irrigated area and/or changing the designated
crops. Once farmers have planted a certain
area with crops of their choice, then as per
Irrigation Acts of many countries, it becomes
obligatory on the part of the agency to provide
water to all the planted area. This leads to
inadequacy and change in the operational plan.
Coping with scarcity
1 of water supply for
managing irrigation under uncertain and
inadequate conditions has become part and
parcel of many irrigation systems in the
semiarid tropics of Asia. This situation has been
created as explained above, by a change in
hydrology of the catchment undergoing
transitions, due to high variability of seasonal
rainfall and improper estimation of reservoir
inflow, and mainly due to stakeholders not
adhering to rules and regulations put in place.
This report, through a case study of the
Kirindi Oya Irrigation and Settlement Project
(KOISP) in southern Sri Lanka, provides
1The word “scarcity” is used in the sense that the water supply is inadequate for the intended purpose at the time when it is needed.2
evidence of the uncertain and inadequate inflow
into the reservoir and its impact on the
seasonal planning. The report is organized in
two parts. Part I shows the uncertainty
associated with estimated reservoir inflow and
declining inflows to the reservoir leading to
water scarcity at irrigation-system level. Part II
shows coping mechanisms adopted under water-
scarce conditions and their impact on the
performance in the Kirindi Oya irrigation system.
Water scarcity is illustrated by analyzing data
from two dry seasons (1992 yala and 1999 yala).
The report also describes the processes
and procedures that the ID adopted, in
association with FOs, to overcome acute water
shortage that occurred during the 1999 yala and
how it was able to distribute the limited water
supply during the season. An evaluation of
these processes and procedures allows us to
analyze how far the method adopted by the ID
and the farmers has succeeded, where it has
failed, and how this could have been improved
to increase the productivity and production of
the Kirindi Oya system. Such an evaluation
provides not only an insight into the processes
and procedures adopted to bring about a
successful season but also guidance for
managers operating systems under similar
water-scarce conditions to improve their
scheduling and operational plans. The results of
the 1999 yala were compared with those of the
1998 yala, a year of normal water supply to the
reservoir, to determine whether the seasonal
operation was successful or not.3
PART 1
Water Shortages in the KOISP
Introduction
The KOISP is located in the dry zone of the
southeast quadrant of Sri Lanka (figure 1). The
KOISP, an expansion of the old Ellegala
Irrigation System (EIS), comprises the
Lunugamwehera reservoir damming the Kirindi
Oya river upstream of EIS and two main canals
(Right Bank [RB] and Left Bank [LB]) irrigating
about 5,340 hectares (13,560 acres), in addition
to supplying water to the old EIS and the
nearby Badagiriya system. Some salient
features of the system are listed in table 1. The
Lunugamwehera reservoir and the main canals
were completed in 1986 and water issues were
started from the 1986 yala.
Prior to 1991, seasonal allocation decisions
in Kirindi Oya were generally made in a Project
Management Committee (PMC) meeting
2
presided over by the Government Agent (GA).
3
Under the Integrated Management of Major
Irrigation Systems (INMAS) program, farmers
were grouped to form hydrologically based
organizations. These organizations select farmer
representatives who sit with officials from
relevant agencies, including the ID, on joint
management committees that make seasonal
allocation decisions and resolve various
problems. The top-level joint committee is the
PMC and is chaired by the Project Manager
from the Irrigation Management Division (IMD).
4
The INMAS advocates the establishment of a
pyramidal committee structure operating on
three tiers: FOs, DCOs, and the PMC. In the
case of Kirindi Oya, a single PMC was
constituted in 1990 by combining the PMCs of
the old EIS and NIS. In light of participatory
irrigation system management, PMC is the
legitimate decision-making body for seasonal
allocations.
2PMC meeting: Meeting of farmer representatives and irrigation-related officials convened by the GA under the Irrigation Act of Sri Lanka.
3The GA is the chief development executive at district level.
4IMD is an arm of the Ministry of Irrigation and works in parallel with the ID, an agency under the Ministry of Irrigation. IMD was set up to facilitate
input and services in major irrigation projects.
Water Shortages
The water resources of the Kirindi Oya basin
have been the subject of discussion since
the project was initiated. The water
availability in the basin during the planning
stage was found to be overestimated by
about 20 percent. A later study that IWMI
conducted found that the Kirindi Oya
irrigation system is indeed a water-short4
FIGURE 1.
Map of the study area: Kirindi oya irrigation and settlement project.5
TABLE 1.
The KOISP system descriptors.
Descriptor Value
Irrigable area 13,300 ha
Irrigated area 9,430 ha
EIS–4,090 ha
New Irrigation System (NIS)–5,340 ha
Annual rainfall 1,152 mm (maha: 810 mm; yala: 380 mm)
Reference crop potential evapotranspiration 2,000 mm
Method of water supply Main storage reservoir
Lunugamwehera (gross capacity 222 MCM; active capacity 198 MCM)
Five medium old tanks (all interconnected)
Water delivery infrastructures Gravity, with unlined primary, secondary and tertiary canals
Type of water distribution Main canal running continuously and rotational water supply (RWS) in
secondary and tertiary canals
Predominant on-farm irrigation practice Surface irrigation with flooded basin
Major crops Paddy, mainly with banana and vegetables as minor crops
Average farm size 1 ha of paddy land and ¼ ha of homestead
Type of soil
   EIS Alluvial
   NIS Red brown earth (RBE) soils in upland
Low humic gley (LHG) soils in lowland
Type of management Main canals: ID
Secondary canals: DCOs
Tertiary canals: FOs
Field level: Individual farmers
system (IIMI 1990), meaning that, on
average, it does not receive the estimated
design discharge in 3 out of 4 years.
Estimates of average annual flow into the
Lunugamvehera reservoir show a decreasing
trend over time (table 2).  The opinion of the
farmers and officials is that the inflow to the
reservoir takes place only when rainfall is
fairly high. Several factors may have
contributed to this declining inflow, the main
factor being the demographic and land use
changes in the catchment upstream of the
reservoir.
The Kirindi Oya catchment has undergone a
rapid transition since the reservoir started
operations in 1986. Large-scale migration of
settlers to the upstream catchment was reported
after 1986. It was observed during field visits
that large-scale pumping from the river takes
place in the upstream catchment, on either side
of the river (estimated at around 2,000 pumps),
to irrigate cash crops. More than 150 small
reservoirs (tanks irrigating about 20 ha each)
were repaired and rehabilitated for agricultural
purposes since 1986.  River water is also lifted
for domestic purposes of the migrant settlers and
the expanding towns nearby. All these activities
may have had a marked effect on the inflow to
the reservoir (table 2).
The objective of this part of the paper is to
investigate whether there is any significant
decrease in inflow to the reservoir due to




Estimates of flow into the Lunugamwehera reservoir.
Year Agency Data Used Average Inflow 75 % Probable Remarks
(MCM) (ac. ft) Inflow (MCM)
1977 Asian Development
Bank Appraisal
(ADB 1977) - 392 318,000 - -
1986 Asian Development
Bank Restudy
(ADB 1986) - 315 255,000 - -
1994 ID in collaboration
with IWMI
(IWMI 1994) 1986–1992 290 235,000 181 Monthly data
2000 IWMI present
study 1989–1999 279 226,000 166 Monthly data
Note: 1 hectare-meter (ha-m) =  8.1 acre-feet (ac.ft.), approximately.
Details of time series on water lifting or use in
the upstream catchment are not available.
Therefore, values of rainfall in the catchment
along with values of inflows to the reservoir are
used for this analysis. The monthly inflow data
(from October 1989 to September 1999) are
available from the IWMI database (figure 2)
while continuous monthly rainfall data of only
two stations in the catchment (Bandara Eliya
Estate at 64° 7´ N and 81° .01´ E; and Ella
(Kinnelan Estate) at 6° 52´ N and 81° .03´ E)
were available at the Meteorological Department.
We take the simple average of the two stations
as the monthly catchment rainfall (figure 3).
Though this may not accurately reflect the exact
amount of rainfall in the catchment, it
sufficiently indicates the trends of rainfall in the
catchment for the study period.
Contribution from Rainfall to Trends of
Inflow
To estimate the trends of inflow, the contribution
of rainfall to the reservoir inflow has to be
quantified first. Although the average rainfall of
two stations may not give a sufficiently accurate
estimate of average rainfall in the catchment, it
may estimate the contribution to inflow due to
variations in rainfall with sufficient accuracy.
The inflow of a certain month could be related
to the rainfall of that month and to the rainfall of
the previous months (figure 4). The contribution
of the previous month’s rainfall on the current
month inflow may either enter as the direct
inflow (if the previous month’s rain falls in the
latter part of the previous month) or as the base
flow (if the previous month’s rain falls in the
early part of the previous month).  We
estimated the effect of the rainfall of two
successive months on the inflow to the
reservoir.
Seasonal Effects
To uncover any trends after eliminating the
effects of rainfall on reservoir inflow, we
estimate any seasonal (monthly) variations left
in the inflow series.  For instance, the inflow of7
FIGURE 2.
Monthly inflow, 1989 October–1999 September.
FIGURE 3.
Monthly rainfall, 1989 October–1999 September.8
FIGURE 4.
Mean monthly rainfall in reservoir catchment and inflow to the reservoir.
some months may be higher or lower than
others even after accounting for the effect of
rainfall. We use dummy variables (i.e., = 1 for
the particular month and = 0 for other months).
For the monthly data we use 11 dummy
variables for January through November and
keep December as a baseline for comparison.
Dummy variables for January through November
show the variation of inflow compared to the
month of December.
Trends of Inflow
We attribute any declining trend in reservoir
inflow after extracting the effects of rainfall and
seasonalities to the increased consumption in
water use in the upstream catchment. Since the
trend per month is expected to be small, we
estimate only the trend per year. To represent
the number of years for each observation from
the beginning time period, we start the first
month with 1/12 and add 1/12 to each
succeeding month.  Let,
INFLOWt = Inflow of the tth month
RFt = Rainfall of the tth  month
RFt-1 = Rainfall of the (t –1)th month,
JAN = Dummy variable of 0 and 1’s, i.e., JAN = 1, if the
month is January, and = 0 otherwise,
FEB = Dummy variable of 0 and 1’s, i.e., FEB = 1, if the
month is February, and = 0 otherwise,
Similarly, we define dummy variables MAR,
APR, MAY, JUN, JUL, AUG, SEP, OCT, and
NOV for March through November.
TRENDt =Trend variable (We define TREND=1/
12 in 1989 January,…TREND=11 in
1999 December)9
Using the above variables, the regression
equation is written as
The first three components on the right-hand
side of the equation are the effect of rainfall, the
next 11 dummy variables represent the additional
monthly effects, and the last component is the
annual trend. Estimates of the coefficients of the
regression equation are given in table 3.
The constant term 22.2 is the predicted
inflow at the beginning of the time period, after
removing the seasonal effects. The rainfall
values of the current month and the previous
month are significant in explaining the variation
of inflows to the reservoir.
In addition to the rainfall effects there are
substantial variations between monthly inflows.
For example, the monthly effects in November,
January, March, April and May compared to
December are not statistically significantly
different. However, the effects of the deviations
of yala months, especially in June, July, August
and September are significantly lower compared
to the effects in December.
Most importantly, the inflows, after filtering
the effects of rainfall and seasonal effects,
show a significant declining trend over the
10-year period (figure 2). From 1989 to 1999,
there is, on average, an annual decline of
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Estimates of the coefficient of the regression equation.
Coefficient Meaning Estimate t-statistic
Constant 22.2 3.0*
RFt Effect of tth month’s rainfall 0.056 7.4*
RFt-1 Effect of (t-1)st , previous month’s rainfall 0.042 5.1*
JAN Difference of January inflow from December inflow -11.4 -1.5
FEB Difference of February inflow from December inflow -18.1 -2.3*
MAR Difference of March inflow from December inflow -14.7 -1.6
APR Difference of April inflow from December inflow -2.4 -0.3
MAY Difference of May inflow from December inflow -11.3 -1.3
JUN Difference of June inflow from December inflow -22.9 -3.2*
JUL Difference of July inflow from December inflow -23.1 -3.1*
AUG Difference of August inflow from December inflow -25.5 -3.5*
SEP Difference of September inflow from December inflow -30.1 -4.1*
OCT Difference of October inflow from December inflow -21.6 -2.8*
NOV Difference of November inflow from December inflow -3.2 -0.4
TRENDt Trend of inflow -0.368 -2.2*
R2 0.82
* Statistically significant at 0.05 level.10
Indeed, as observed in the field, there is a
significant declining trend of inflow to the
reservoir. However, the inflow has declined
slowly over the 10-year period. The slow
decreasing rate would suggest that this is a
major problem only in months of low rainfall. If
the rainfall is low, then in these months, little or
no inflow would have entered the reservoir. Such
situations in Kirindi Oya have, in fact, occurred
in the 1992 and 1999 yala seasons (table 4). The
inflows to the reservoir during part of the
seasons were so low that the Kirindi Oya system
had experienced a severe water-deficit situation.
In the 1992 yala, the reservoir received only
35 MCM of inflow against an average of 83
MCM. In the last four months (June to
September) of the 1992 yala, inflow was only
7.1 MCM. The inflow during the same period in
1999 was only 2.4 MCM. However, the total
values of rainfall of these months in the 2 years
are more or less the same (342 mm in 1992
and 347 mm in 1999). In fact, there was no
inflow to the reservoir in August 1999. During
the 1999 yala the reservoir received only 63.5
MCM against an average of 83 MCM.
The severe impact of reservoir inflow during
dry months of a water-scarce year has impact
on the seasonal decision-making process of
both farmers and agency officials in completely
different ways. While the agency officials were
very conservative in restricting the paddy
cultivated area in a scarce year, the farmers did
not understand the rationale for curtailment of
paddy irrigated area and irrigated more area
than what was decided at the PMC meeting,
exacerbating the water-stress situation. Our
focus in Part II is the coping mechanism of the
agency officials and farmers in alleviating the
negative impact of the water-stress situation in
these seasons.
TABLE 4.
Rainfall and reservoir inflow of maha and yala seasons: 1989–1999 average, 1991–1992, 1997–1998 and 1998–1999.
   Average
1989–1999 1991–1992 1997–1998 1998–1999
Season Month Rainfall Inflow Rainfall Inflow Rainfall Inflow Rainfall Inflow
mm MCM mm MCM mm MCM mm MCM
Maha October 297 22.9 253 8.0 614 81.0 87 0.7
November 358 61.6 368 34.4 645 204.4 181 26.1
December 201 51.3 349 33.8 261 135.7 320 56.7
January 174 27.3 41 17.9 118 47.3 456 34.4
February 107 15.8 0 5.4 27 21 365 27.5
March 138 18.2 0 2.9 89 23 499 22.3
Total 1,275 197.1 1,012 102.4 1,754 512.4 1,909 167.7
Yala April 232 36.8 216 13.8 75 9.7 217 56.4
May 171 30.4 112 13.9 252 27.8 90 4.7
June 42 7.1 9 2.3 21 2.3 53 1.9
July 65 2.6 39 0.9 117 6.1 83 0.1
August 81 2.1 72 0.6 155 5.8 51 0.0
September 178 3.6 222 3.3 41 1.4 160 0.4
Total 769 82.6 672 34.8 662 53.1 655 63.5
Annual total 2,044 280 1,684 137 2,416 566 2,564 231
Reservoir storage at
beginning of yala 103.6 37.5 192.3 101.811
Part II
Water Scarcities and Agricultural Performance
to receive water in each season. The NIS was
divided into 3 zones with LB tracts 1, 2 and 3
as zone 1, RB tracts 1 and 2 as zone 2 and
RB tracts 5, 6 and 7 as zone 3 (figure 1), each
having approximately 1,800 hectares (4,500
acres) and their priority to receive water in each
season was rotated in a cyclic order. If zone 1
has the priority to receive water during maha,
followed by zones 2 and 3, then in yala, zone 2
will have the first priority followed by zones 3
and 1, respectively, in that order.
The procedure followed for water release
from the reservoir during maha is briefly as
follows:
· The volume of water stored between the sill
level (+150.0) and the minimum operating
level (MOL) (+155.0) is reserved as the
drinking water supply for the new settlers.
Introduction
Two factors, the probable monthly flow and the
storage at the time of planning, are dominant in
seasonal planning. Smaller actual inflows
during the season than expected at the
planning stage lead to inadequate water
situations. Moreover, the deviations of cropping
patterns from the schedule that was agreed at
the planning stage exacerbate the water-
shortage situation. The 1992 yala and the 1999
yala at the KOISP are typical examples of the
above situations. In this part we investigate the
coping mechanisms that were adopted by
farmers and agency officials in KOISP to
mitigate the water-scarce situations and their
impact on the agricultural performance. We
start Part II with a brief description of water
allocation decisions in the KIOSP. In the
following sections, we describe data collection
procedure, and water scarcities and agricultural
performance in the 1992 yala and 1999 yala.
Water-Allocation Decisions
From the start of the KOISP in 1986 and until
1990, the old EIS and the NIS were managed
as two separate entities by the ID without much
consultation and communication between and
among the stakeholders. After the formation of
a single PMC in 1990, the ID, with the assistance
of IWMI (then called IIMI) prepared seasonal
operational plans for both maha and yala, taking
into account the storage in the Lunugamwehera
reservoir and the five EIS tanks at the time of
planning (generally November 1), the expected
75 percent probable inflow to the reservoir and
the zoning of the NIS with a priority order to
receive water and start the maha cultivation in
a staged manner (IWMI 1994).
This zoning procedure was necessary
because of the inadequate water inflow to the
Lunugamwehera reservoir. In view of the
riparian right of the EIS it has the first priority12
· If the storage volume above MOL is less
than 1,852 hectare-meters (ha-m) (15,000
ac. ft.), then no water is released for
irrigation for any command.
· If the storage is greater than 1,852 ha-m
(15,000 ac. ft.) but less than 3,704 ha-m.
(30,000 ac. ft.), then water is released only
to the EIS for land preparation.
· If the storage is greater than 3,704 ha-m
(30,000 ac. ft.), then for every additional
5,000 ac. ft. one tract in the new area is
supplied with water and the tract selected
for receiving water is as per priority order
discussed previously.
The rationale for this kind of staged release
of water during maha is to avert the problem of
shortage, if any, and at the same time to
capture the rainfall to the maximum extent
possible. The extent of area thrown open for
maha cultivation is based on a simple rule of
thumb that an area to be irrigated with paddy
during maha needs 1,950 to 2,100 mm (6.5 to
7.0 ac. ft./acre) as reservoir sluice discharge.
During yala, the planning is based on the
water left over in the reservoir at the end of the
maha and the expected inflow during the yala.
The same criteria as used for maha (6.5 to 7.0
ac. ft./acre) are also used for yala to determine
the extent of area, and the above-mentioned
priority order is used to identify the tracts to be
irrigated in yala.
The ID proposes the planning schedule and
then the PMC discusses it at length to decide
on the area to be thrown open for irrigation,
date for completing maintenance activities by
the DCOs and start and end dates of water
release and completion date for land
preparation. Also, each month during the
season, the PMC meets to take stock of the
water supply situation for the remaining period
of the season. With the help of distributary
channel farmer leaders, the ID implements the
PMC-approved planning schedule.
Over the last 10 years of operation, two
important changes have taken place. One is
with respect to the cropping pattern. Farmers
have become accustomed to growing paddy
during both maha and yala. Raising paddy  in
both seasons has resulted in a serious problem
for the long-term performance of the system in
that growing paddy during yala leaves very little
water in the reservoir to start the maha
cultivation in time and to the full extent and vice
versa. The old areas are the priority areas to
receive water and will irrigate every maha; on
the other hand, new area tracts may receive
water along with the old area only when the
reservoir inflow is sufficient enough. In some
years, some of the tracts of the new area did
not receive water even during maha. The paddy-
growing culture has had a great impact on the
underdevelopment of the new area, exacerbated
by the dwindling flow to the reservoir, especially
during yala. There is a kind of mindset among
farmers of Kirindi Oya that irrigated agriculture
means growing paddy. Even the banana
cultivation that was given a push by the agency
and the lending banks did not pick up very
much. Banana cultivation has got stabilized at
about 480 hectares (1,200 acres) in the NIS.
Also cultivation of other field crops (OFCs) like
vegetables is limited to certain pockets in the
LB tracts of NIS where farmers are specializing
in vegetable cultivation.
The other change is with respect to the
operation of main canals and distributary
channels during the crop-growing period. Prior
to the 1998 yala, the main canal was operated
continuously and distributaries were closed and
opened according to the needs as perceived by
farmers and sometimes discharges were
adjusted based on the decision of gate
operators, leading to inequity problems. Starting
with the 1999 yala, two alternatives were made
in the operational schedule. The first alternatives13
is with respect to the operations of the main
canal and distribution channels; both the main
canal and distributary channels were operated
in an “on” and “off” mode with farmers knowing
in advance the rotation pattern to overcome the
head-tail inequity problems. This has made a
marked change in the distribution of water
within and between the field channels. While
the above-mentioned planning procedure is
generally adopted during the normal and wet
years, the procedure adopted for water
distribution in a water-scarce or drought year,
especially when the drought sets in after
farmers have planted their fields, is different.
In such water-scarce years, the second
alternative of delivering available water is
adopted where the supply can be stretched up
to the end of crop maturity.
Data-Collection Procedure
Several steps were adopted for collecting the
requisite data for this study.  Reservoir
outflow data and meteorological data were
collected from the ID. The drainage data of
the command area and time series of monthly
inflow data to the Lunugamwehera reservoir
were obtained from the IWMI database. The
minutes of the PMCs were perused to find out
the decisions made at different stages of
planning during and before the crop-growing
season. The authors undertook a number of
field visits to discuss matters with farmers,
DCO leaders and agencies involved in
operating and managing the system. Additional
information required to answer specific
questions was ascertained through a
questionnaire, which was pre-tested and
refined. Altogether 157 sample farmers were
selected for the study. The coordinates of
selected farmers’ fields were determined using
the GPS and the sampled field plots were
plotted in a GIS map to analyze the yield
data. The farmers’ answers to the
questionnaire were analyzed and the results of
farmers’ perceptions and their views were
discussed with the system-operating agency
to authenticate the veracity of farmers’
responses.
Water Scarcity, 1992 Yala
The year 1992 was a drought year. The
Lunugamwehera reservoir received only 137
MCM of water against an average inflow of 280
MCM. The dry period started in the latter part of
the 1991/92 maha and continued during the
1992 yala with less rainfall in January and
February. As a result, at the end of the 1991/92
maha all the tanks except Wirawila in the EIS
were empty (see figure 1). The water level in
the Lunugamwehera reservoir at the beginning
of March was +162.5 (against the MOL of +155)
with a storage of 19 MCM (15,420 ac. ft.),
which was just sufficient to irrigate the standing
maha paddy crop in the RB and OFCs in LB
tract 3. In view of these situations and the
unlikely event of receiving sufficient inflow, the
ID warned the EIS farmers that water might not
be sufficient for cultivating a yala paddy crop in14
the whole of EIS. However, despite the warnings
of irrigation officials, the EIS farmers planted
the whole area with paddy due to a lack of
understanding of the importance of the MOL and
the use of water below the MOL, mistrust of
irrigation officials, and a desire to establish a
right for yala water to irrigate the whole of EIS
with paddy.
The ID was compelled to issue water from
1 May 1992 although the reservoir had only a
limited volume of water. The inflow to the reservoir
in yala (35 MCM against the expected 83 MCM)
was not sufficient to cater to the needs of all the
old areas. The farmers, with the approval of local
political leaders, used a portion of water stored
below MOL that was earmarked as the drinking
water supply, for irrigation to tide over the crisis.
Yet, they fell short of the required volume of water
and, in spite of all their efforts, the 1992 yala was
a season of complete crop failure except for the
Wirawila tank command, which had the benefit of
confusion in changing the scheduling already
formulated. The unexpected action of farmers
impelled the farmer representatives and the
Irrigation Managers to consult each other to
arrive at an operational plan for the best use of
the limited water supply available in the
reservoir. The plan arrived at and implemented
was as follows:
· During the land preparation period, the main
canal was run continuously at full supply
discharge and all distributaries were
supplied with water to complete land
preparation in as short a time as possible.
Considerable cooperation and help obtained
from DCO leaders and FO representatives
made this possible.
receiving drainage water from tracts 2 and 5 of
the NIS from the previous season.
The dramatic event of the 1992 yala taught
important lessons to farmers. At the beginning
of the season, the EIS farmers distrusted the
data on water availability that the ID provided.
The distrust was caused in part by the failure of
ID officials to explain the working of the
reservoir and, especially, the significance of the
MOL. The attempts to get more water during the
season taught farmers a great deal about
reservoir operations. By the end of the season,
most EIS farmers understood the significance of
the MOL for seasonal water allocations.
The Ellegala farmers learned it was not wise
to disregard the ID warnings as counseled by
some of their leaders. The 1992 yala event
brings out the importance of rapport,
understanding and trust among farmers and
agencies managing the system for making a
successful season.
Water Scarcity, 1999 Yala
The water availability at the beginning of the
1999 yala and monthly reservoir inflow given in
table 4 indicate the severity of the situation
where the availability of the water supply for the
1999 yala (102 MCM) is concerned. In view of
the limited water supply and low storage at the
beginning of the season, the PMC took a
decision to cultivate 70 percent of the NIS
command area with paddy and the remaining 30
percent with OFCs. Although the farmer
representatives agreed to this decision at the
PMC meeting, without heeding to the PMC
decision the farmers went ahead and planted
100 percent of the area with paddy. This
created a crisis of water inadequacy for the
1999 yala. Also, the expected inflow into the
reservoir did not materialize causing further15
· After broadcasting paddy, farmers used to
flood and drain their fields alternately two or
three times to protect sprouting broadcasted
paddy plants from submersion and to
overcome the submersion effect of heavy
rains likely to occur during this period.
Generally, this process takes about a
month. During the water-scarce 1999 yala
the period of flushing and draining was
restricted to 15 days only.
· Subsequent to this, rotational water supply
in both the main canal and the distributary
channels was started in an “on” and “off”
mode. To determine the days of rotation, the
agency computed the total number of days
that all main canals could run at full supply
discharge with the available storage and
expected inflow into the reservoir. The
2 The water supply to the RB and LB canals
was more or less continuous during the
1998 yala while in the 1999 yala, rotational
water supply was introduced after the land
preparation and nursery stages. During the
rotation, the daily supply to the RB canal
was gradually increased from 0.82 MCM to
1.1 MCM per day while the LB canal supply
was kept constant except during the end of
the crop-growth season. Water supply to the
RB during the period of flowering and
milking stage (100 to 120 days after the
issue of water) was very much below par
and fluctuating compared to the other
periods that had affected the RB canal yield
to a considerable extent.
number of weeks that water had to be
supplied being known, the number of days
in a week that the main canals would run at
full supply was worked out and the canals
were operated accordingly.
· The number of days that the main canals
could run at full supply discharge was
reviewed periodically by the PMC and
adjustments were made to the number of
days of canal running in a week to stretch
the water supply to the end of the season.
· The DCO leaders and FO representatives
took responsibility for the distribution of the
water received at the distributary head to
different field channels and within the field-
channel command area.
Analysis of Water-Supply Distribution
The main- canal water issues for the RB, LB
and Ellegala Feeder Canal (EFC) for the normal
1998 yala and the 1999 water-scarce yala are
shown in figure 5. The total water issued is
presented in table 5. In figure 5, the X-axis
represents the days since the start of the
season and the Y-axis represents the volume of
water released per day in MCM. A comparison
of the distribution indicates the following:
1 In the 1998 yala, water was supplied to the
main canals for almost 6 months while in
the 1999 yala it was restricted to only
5 months. Shortening the water-release
period from 6 months to 5 months was an
attempt to save water.16
3 The average volume of water supplied per
day during the 1998 yala was approximately
0.8 MCM (less than full supply discharge)
while in the 1999 yala, it was approximately
1.0 MCM, which was nearly the full supply
discharge of the RB canal. The case of the
LB canal is similar.
4 The EFC was supplied with water in an
intermittent fashion in both the seasons.
FIGURE 5.
Water issues for RB, LB and EFC in the 1998 yala and 1999 yala.
While the RB and LB canals received less
water supply during the 1999 yala compared
to the 1998 yala, the EFC received more
supply during the 1999 yala (table 5). The
reason for this increased supply to the EFC
is that the quantum of drainage flow, which
the old tanks should receive from RB and
LB tracts, did not materialize during the
1999 yala (table 6).17
TABLE 6.
Drainage flow.
System Drainage Flow (MCM)
   
 Reduction
1998 1999
     (%)
Old system 20.75 13.11 37.0
RB tract 5 13.31 5.84 56.0
From the above observations and analysis,
the following can be inferred from the water
distribution and operation of the main canal
distribution system in the KOISP.
· The main objective of the ID during the
1999 yala was to extend the limited water
supply to the end of the crop-growing
season to help mature the crops. It was
able to achieve this by limiting the water
supply to the canal to 5 months instead of
the normal 6 months and introducing
rotational water supply during the crop-
growing period and operating the canal at
full supply discharge.
· The major deficiency in the ID’s planning
was in estimating the total inflow available
for distribution. The expected inflow during
yala did not materialize resulting in reduced
number of days of supply as well as the
impossibility of operating the main canal at
full supply discharge throughout the rotation
period resulting in a head-tail inequity.
· Had the ID foreseen this shortfall in supply
at a very early stage of the crop-growing
period, it would have changed the operational
plan. With the present operational practice,
the crops in the RB and LB tail-end tracts
were stressed to a considerable extent
during the critical crop-growth stages,
thereby drastically reducing the yield.
· The intermittent irrigation introduced during
the 1999 yala had the following positive
impacts:
TABLE 5.
Comparison of water issues during the 1998 yala and the 1999 yala.
Area (ha)
Total Issues (MCM) Total Issues (mm)
1998 1999 1998 1999
New Area
LB area 1,943 52.542 39.996 2,704 2,058
RB area 3,273 84.022 57.320 2,567 1,751
Feeder Canal Diversion 4,194 9.455 16.533 225 394
Old Area
Weerawila 931 22.993 29.249 2,469 3,141
Debarawewa 405 6.599 6.580 1,630 1,625
Tissawewa 1,113 7.983 10.843 717 974
Yodawewa 1,336 19.373 10.518 1,450 787
Pannegamuwa 226 No data No data No data No data
Note:  The Debarawewa tank releases for 1999 as shown are estimated, as nearly 60 days of data are missing.18
· Farmers in the old Ellegala system who
have clayey and clay-loam soils got
higher yields than in normal years (see
next section). Further investigation is
needed to determine the exact reason. The
season had almost clear days all through
with good sunshine and no pest attack.
· The drainage flow to the sea from both
the EIS and tract 5 has been
considerably reduced due to rotational
water supply (table 6).
· Farmers became more disciplined in
receiving water and using it efficiently due
to the higher management effort of the DCO
leaders and field channel representatives.
· The reuse of drainage water has
considerably increased; farmers have
cross-bunded drainage channels at
convenient places and diverted the
drainage water to their fields either by
gravity or by pumping.
· Until recently, farmers were of the
opinion that drainage water was not
good for reuse and were not using the
drainage water. The water scarcity
during the 1999 yala has forced them to
reuse drainage water, which has now
been accepted by the farmers and is
being practiced in the 2000 yala.
The ID has also learnt a number of lessons:
· It has learnt how to manage a system
during a water crisis. Now it is careful in
estimating the yala inflow; in fact, the ID
argues that the yala inflow in water-scarce
years should not be taken into account for
planning the yala crops and cropping
pattern; instead it should be used as a
reserve storage for starting the following
maha cultivation in time and the maha
rainfall can be effectively used.
· The ID claims that the successful completion
of the 1999 yala is mainly due to three factors:
· Cooperation received from the DCO
leaders, FO representatives and lower-
level ID field staff.
· The simultaneous operation of the main
canal and the distribution channels in an
“on” and “off” mode.
· Due to adverse criticism raised in the
public media, the ID felt challenged to
make the season a success and has
put in a large management effort in
coordinating the activities of the various
stakeholders.
Analysis and Results of the Questionnaire Survey
A sample of 157 farmers was surveyed from the
KOISP area to assess the changes in
performance due to changes in water-delivery
strategies under water-scarce conditions. Table 7
gives the breakdown of the surveyed farmers
according to the schemes, location with respect
to the field channel, tenure system and soil type
of the farm.19
TABLE 7.
Breakdown of the surveyed farmers according to the schemes, location with respect to the field channel, tenure system
and soil type of the farm.
General information
     Composition (number and percent1) of sample farmers
LB RB Old EIS Total
Total number of farmers 31 50 76 157
Location with respect to the field channel
Head  6  (19%) 21 (42%) 24 (32%) 51 (33%)
Middle 13 (42%) 12 (24%) 24 (32%) 49 (31%)
Tail 12 (39%) 17 (34%) 28 (36%) 57 (36%)
Tenure system
Owner 26 (84%) 48 (96%) 31 (41%) 105 (67%)
Lessee 5 (16%) 2 (4%) 10 (13%) 17 (11%)
Tenant 0 0 35 (46%) 35 (22%)
Soil type
Can retain standing water 21 (68%) 28 (56%) 60 (79%) 109 (69%)
Cannot retain standing water 10 (32%) 22 (44%) 16 (21%) 48 (31%)
1Percentage is with respect to the system total.
Water Delivery: Farmers￿ Perception
to have decreased, from 60 percent in the
nursery stage (NS) to 16 percent in the
flowering and milking stage (FMS). Almost all
farms in the LB and RB had rotational water
supply after the nursery stage. One-third of the
farmers in EIS received continuous supply even
in the FMS stage.
Number of Dry Days in a Rotation
The average number of dry days in a rotation
is highest in the RB and is lowest in the EIS.
The average number of dry days at the RB
has increased from 3.4 days in the NS to
5.2 days in the FMS (figure 6). Increasing
number of dry days in the rotational schedule
is reflected in the farmers’ responses on
water adequacy.
Almost all the sampled farmers were aware of
the decisions taken at the PMC meetings on
the water delivery schedule (table 8).  It is
estimated that the LB and RB farmers have
experienced significant delays in water
delivery from the agreed date of water
delivery. It was also observed that the
nonowner farmers have reported a
significantly higher delay in the starting date
of water delivery than the owners.
Mode of Water Delivery
Almost all farmers in KOISP are estimated to
have received continuous water supply during
the land preparation stage (table 8). In the
subsequent stages, the number of farmers
receiving continuous water supply is estimated20
TABLE 8.
Farmers’ knowledge of water delivery.
Factor
Distribution among Systems
LB RB EIS KOISP
Farmers’ knowledge on the PMC decision on
the water delivery schedule (%) 94 86 93 91
Delay in water delivery (average number of
days between agreed and actual water delivery) 14 9 0 6
Continuous mode of water supply
    - LP stage (%) 100 92 100 97
    - NS stage (%) 35 32 89 60
    - TS stage (%) 6 6 51 28
    - BS stage (%) 6 0 37 19
    - FMS stage (%) 3 0 31 16
LP=Land preparation; NS=Nursery stage; TS=Tillering stage; BS=Booting stage; FMS = Flowering and milking stage.
FIGURE 6.
Number of dry days in a rotation at NS, TS, BS and FMS.
Perception on Water Adequacy
It was estimated that the majority of the farmers
(92%) in all three systems have reported
receiving an adequate volume of water during
the land preparation stage (figure 7).
Most of the farmers in the old EIS have
reported receiving adequate water deliveries in
all stages (maximum of 92% in the NS to a
minimum of 71% in the FMS). However, a
different picture emerges in the LB and RB with
the start of the rotational water supply. Only
Note:  NS, TS, BS, and FMS are as in table 8. LB= Left Bank; RB = Right Bank; EIS  = Ellegala Irrigation System.21
FIGURE 7.
Farmers’ perception on adequacy of water delivery at different stages.
Note: LP = Land preparation; NS = Nursery stage; TS = Tillering stage; BS = Booting stage; FMS = Flowering and milking stage; LB= Left Bank;
RB = Right Bank; EIS  = Ellegala Irrigation System.22
about 40 percent of the farmers in the LB
have reported receiving an adequate water
delivery since the land-preparation stage. In
the RB, the number of farmers who had
received an adequate supply decreased
rapidly from 70 percent in the NS to only
10 percent in the FMS.
Farmers have reported several negative
effects due to water delivery inadequacies such
as their inability to apply fertilizer, weedicide
and pesticide in time, stunted plant growth,
insufficient tillering and bearing of unfertile
panicles. All these factors may have direct
negative effect on the paddy yield.
Paddy Yield
Variation in the Paddy Yield
There is a substantial variation in the paddy
yields (standard deviation of 3.4 tons/ha) in the
KIOSP area in the 1999 yala. The average
paddy yield in the KOISP is 4.0 tons/ha; more
than 50 percent of the farmers have reported
yields less than 3.75 tons/ha.
The average yield in the 1999 yala was
significantly lower than that in the 1998 yala
(figure 8). However, it is interesting to note
that most farmers producing high-yielding
varieties in 1998 have obtained even higher
yields in the 1999 yala, the majority of them
located in the old EIS. Table 9 shows the
distribution of farmers according to the four
quartiles of the 1999 yala paddy yields.
The majority of the farmers (97%) whose
1999 yields are in the fourth quartile (greater
than 6.0 tons/ha) were from the old EIS. More
than 81 percent of the farmers, whose 1999
paddy yields are in the upper quartile, have
reported lower yields in 1998. Seventy
percent of the farmers whose 1999 paddy
yields are in the third quartile (between 3.75
and 6.0 tons/ha), have reported lower yields
in 1998.
All farmers whose 1999 yields are in the
first quartile (less than 1.35 tons/ha) have
reported significantly higher paddy yields in
1998. Most of the farmers (73%) in this group
are from the RB. Only 17 percent of the
farmers whose 1999 paddy yields are in the
second quartile (between 1.35 and 3.75 tons per
ha) have reported higher paddy yields in 1998.
As far as inputs are concerned, the average
fertilizer applications in the four quartiles are not
significantly different. Indeed it is clear that
water-related factors are the main causes for
the yield differences in 1999.
A substantial number of farmers whose 1999
yields are in the first quartile have reported
water delivery inadequacies in all stages of crop
growth. Most of these farmers are in the RB.
Only 11 percent of the farmers in this category
have reported water adequacies in the BS and
only 2 in the FMS.
Besides the uneven yield distribution
between the EIS and NIS it is clear from
figures 8 and 9 that there is a head-tail
problem between the tracts in the NIS. In the
LB the yields of tract 1 and tract 3 are
4.8 tons/ha and 1.8 tons/ha, respectively. In
the RB the yields are even lower: RB tract 1
with 3.2 tons/ha and tract 7 with 0.6 tons/ha.
The head-tail problem is mainly due to water
inadequacy. Figure 9 also brings out the
inequity in yields within a tract indicating that
water distribution within a tract is not
equitable and head-tail problems prevail.23
FIGURE 8.
Paddy yields in the 1998 yala and the 1999 yala.
Note: LB= Left Bank; RB = Right Bank; EIS  = Ellegala Irrigation System.24
Yield Versus Water Inadequacy
The link between water inadequacies at different
stages and lower crop yields is investigated
here. We use dependent variable, 1999 paddy
yield (log transform), in a regression analysis to
estimate the effect of water inadequacies on
yield.
Explanatory variables
FERT (fertilizer application per ha) (log
transform)
D1 (dummy variables for farmers’ perception
of water adequacy in the LP, i.e., D1=0, if
water delivery is inadequate, and =1, if
delivery is adequate)
D2 (dummy variables for farmers’ perception
of water adequacy in the NS)
D3 (dummy variables for farmers’ perception
of water adequacy in the TS)
D4 (dummy variables for farmers’ perception
of water adequacy in the BS)
D5 (dummy variables for farmers’ perception
of water adequacy in the FMS)
Farmers who report water delivery
inadequacies in an earlier stage have a higher
probability in reporting inadequacies in the
subsequent stages. Therefore, farmers’
perceptions on water adequacy at different
stages are highly correlated. To overcome the
multicollinearity problem due to high correlation
in the last five explanatory variables, we create
two new variables. These are the first two
principal components of the five dummy
variables. These are linear combinations of the
TABLE 9.
Farmers reporting water delivery inadequacies in different yield quartiles.
1999 Paddy Yields
Factor
First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile
( <1.35 tons/ha) (>1.35 & 3.75 tons/ha)  (>3.75 & 6.0 tons/ha) (>6.0 tons/ha)
Number of farmers –Total 44 42 40 31
LB (%) 23 31 18 3
LB (%) 73 29 15 0
EIS (%) 4 40 67 97
% farmers with 1999 yield > 1998 yield 0 17 70 81
1998 average yield (tons/ha) 4.2 3.9 4.7 8.0
1999 average yield (tons/ha) 0.6 2.6 5.1 9.4
Fertilizer application(kg/ha) 389 427 449 452
% reported adequacy in NS 50 67 92 100
% reported adequacy in TS 20 57 90 94
% reported adequacy in BS 11 54 87 94
% reported adequacy in FMS 2 36 75 81
Note: NS=Nursery stage; TS=Tillering stage; BS=Booting stage; FMS = Flowering and milking stage.25
FIGURE 9.
Spatial distribution of yield in the 1999 yala: Kirindi Oya irrigation and settlement project.26
five dummy variables and explain 80 percent of
their variation. The factor scores of the linear
combinations are given in table 10.
TABLE 10.
Factor scores of the first two principal components.
Variable1 First Principal Second Principal
Component (PR1) Component (PR2)
D1 (LP) 0.442  0.835
D2 (NS) 0.766  0.311
D3 (TS) 0.894 -0.143
D4 (BS) 0.899 -0.261
D5 (FMS) 0.821 -0.268
1Standardized dummy variables.
The first principal component has small
weight for the dummy variable for land
preparation stage and large weights for the
nursery stage onwards. Most of the farmers
reported adequate water supply in the land
preparation stage. Therefore, the first principal
component explains the effect of adequate water
supply from the second stage (nursery) to the
last stage (flowering and milking). The second
principal component has positive weights for the
dummy variables of land preparation and
nursery stages and negative weights for the
tillering, booting and flowering/milking stages.
This can be interpreted as the effect due to
adequate water supply in the land preparation
and nursery stages but with inadequate water
supply in the last three stages.
The estimated regression equation is given
below:
Log (yield) =1.142 +0.004 log (FERT) + 0.475* PR1 - 0.083** PR2
                        (0.827)  (0.137)                 (0.045)        (0.045)
The numbers within parentheses are the
standard errors of the estimated coefficients.
The superscript asterisk, * and double
asterisks, ** indicate that the coefficients are
significantly different from zero at 5 percent and
10 percent significant levels, respectively.
Nonsignificance of fertilizer variable in
increasing yield is indicated by marginal
increase in yield with respect to unit fertilizer
increase. In fact, all systems in KOISP applied
more than 390 kg/ha during the 1999 yala.
The significance of PR1 indicates the
positive influence of water adequacy of all four
stages of the crop growth on crop yield. The
significant coefficient of PR2 indicates the
negative influence of water inadequacies in the
last three stages (TS, BS and FMS) of crop
growth on crop yield.
Conclusions
The Kirindi Oya catchment has undergone a
rapid transformation since the Lunugamwehera
reservoir started operations in 1986. Large-scale
migration of settlers to the upstream catchment
after 1986 resulted in perceptible land-use
changes. Estimated average annual flow into the
reservoir shows a decreasing trend over time.
The de-seasonalized reservoir inflow after
filtering out the rainfall effects has a statistically
significant declining trend, which was attributed
to increased water use in the upstream
catchment. The inflow has been declining
slowly, which suggests that it is a major
problem only in low rainfall months with little or
no inflow entering the reservoir. This situation
occurred in the 1992 yala and the 1999 yala.
The progressive decrease of reservoir inflow
is an indication of the ongoing upstream
development and use of water, which need to be
arrested to sustain agriculture in the already
developed KOISP. In addition, interannual and
intra-annual variation of rainfall in the command27
area of KOISP is so high as to make seasonal
planning unreliable.
Besides the decreasing trend of reservoir
inflow and variability of rainfall, another
important change has taken place, which makes
the Kirindi Oya system even more vulnerable to
drought. Farmers have become accustomed to
growing paddy during both maha and yala. The
practice of growing paddy in yala leaves very
little water in the reservoir to start the maha
cultivations in time and to the full extent, and it
is a threat to the long-term performance of the
system.
The 1992 yala was a season of complete
crop failure except for the Wirawila tank
command. The main reasons for the crop failure
were the planting of paddy in the whole EIS
area despite the ID’s warning. This was
confounded by the lower-than-expected reservoir
inflow during the season.
The 1992 yala taught important lessons to
the EIS farmers. They learnt a great deal about
reservoir operations and most EIS farmers have
now understood the significance of the MOL of
the reservoir for seasonal water allocations. The
EIS farmers learnt it was not wise to disregard
the ID’s advice. The 1992 yala event brings out
the importance of rapport, understanding and
trust among farmers and agencies managing the
system for making a successful season.
The water availability in the reservoir at the
beginning of the 1999 yala was low. Despite the
decisions of the PMC meeting, the farmers
planted the whole area with paddy. To add to
the issue of the low water availability at the
beginning, the anticipated inflow did not
materialize, which created a crisis in water
inadequacy for the 1999 yala.
The ID also learnt from the 1999 yala how
to manage a system in a water crisis and the
ID is now careful in estimating the yala inflow. It
is argued that the yala inflow in water-scarce
years should not be taken into account for
planning the yala crops and the cropping
pattern; instead it should be used as a reserve
storage for starting the following maha
cultivations in time.
The farmers learned from the 1999 yala
season to be more disciplined in water use due
to higher management efforts of the DCO
leaders and field-channel representatives. They
also became aware of the value of the reuse of
drainage water, which was earlier considered
unsuitable for irrigation.
Even with low water supply farmers in the
EIS with clayey and clay-loam soils recorded
higher yields than in normal years. Further
investigation is needed to determine the exact
reason for this increase in yield.
According to the ID, the successful
completion of the 1999 yala was due to the
changed operation of the system, the
cooperation received from the DCO leaders, FO
representatives and lower-level ID field staff,
and due to the ID’s large management effort in
coordinating the activities of the various
stakeholders.
The average yield in the 1999 yala was
significantly lower than that in the 1998 yala,
with a substantial variation in the 1999 yala
yield. Most farmers producing high-yielding
varieties in 1998 have obtained even higher
yields in the 1999 yala, the majority of them
located in the EIS. All farmers with the lowest
yields in 1999 have reported significantly higher
yields in 1998, the majority located in the RB.
Clearly, the water-related factors are the main
causes for the yield differences in the 1999
yala, since inputs, such as fertilizer
applications, are not significantly different. Also
farmers with low yields have reported water
delivery inadequacies in all stages of crop
growth.
Besides the uneven yield distribution
between the EIS and NIS there is a head-tail
problem between and within the tracts in the
NIS, which is mainly due to water shortage,
indicating that water distribution between and
within tracts is also not equitable and that head-
tail problems prevail.28
The evaluation of water distribution practices
and the resulting consequences in the 1999 yala
is a typical example, which contributes to our
knowledge of how to manage an irrigation
system in the case of unexpected water
shortage. The experience teaches how to
manage the system, especially to assure that
adequate water is available during the critical
stages of the crop-growth period to prevent
drastic yield reduction.
While the ID claims that its water
distribution strategy caused the crop to mature,
it could not rectify the head-tail inequity. The
questions are: how should we operate the
system to reduce the gaps in yield and what
should be the institutional arrangements needed
to narrow this gap? Further studies are needed
to reduce spatial yield variability, including the
necessary institutional arrangements.
The agency managing the KOISP has come
a long way in introducing changes and making
the system operation acceptable to farmers;
however, it has yet to develop an operational
plan that will maximize the production of the
system. It is recommended that some of these
successful innovations be tried out in other
irrigation systems with similar hydrologic
settings.29
Literature Cited
ADB (Asian Development Bank). 1977.  Appraisal of the Kirindi Oya Irrigation and Settlement Project in the Republic of
Sri Lanka. Report No. SRI: Ap-13.
ADB. 1986. Appraisal of Kirindi Oya Irrigation and Settlement Project in Sri Lanka (phase 11).  Report No. SRI: Ap-36.
IWMI (International Water Management Institute). 1990. Final Report on the Technical Assistance Study (TA 846 SRI).
Irrigation Management and Crop Diversification in Sri Lanka. Colombo, Sri Lanka.
IWMI. 1994. Final Report on the Technical Assistance Study (TA 1480 SRI). Irrigation Management and Crop
Diversification in Sri Lanka. Colombo, Sri Lanka.
Sanchez, A. Pedro. 1976. Properties and management of soils in the tropics. A Wiley-Interscience Publication. New York:
John Wiley and Sons.Research Reports
41. Urban-Wastewater Reuse for Crop Production in the Water-Short Guanajuato River
Basin, Mexico. Christopher A. Scott, J. Antonio Zarazúa, and Gilbert Levine, 2000.
42. Comparison of Actual Evapotranspiration from Satellites, Hydrological Models
and Field Data. Geoff Kite and Peter Droogers, 2000.
43. Integrated Basin Modeling. Geoff Kite and Peter Droogers, 2000.
44. Productivity and Performance of Irrigated Wheat Farms across Canal Commands
in the Lower Indus Basin. Intizar Hussain, Fuard Marikar, and Waqar Jehangir,
2000.
45. Pedaling out of Poverty: Social Impact of a Manual Irrigation Technology in South
Asia. Tushaar Shah, M. Alam, M. Dinesh Kumar, R. K. Nagar, and Mahendra Singh,
2000.
46. Using Remote Sensing Techniques to Evaluate Lining Efficacy of Watercourses.
R. Sakthivadivel, Upali A. Amarasinghe, and S. Thiruvengadachari, 2000.
47. Alternate Wet Dry Irrigation in Rice Cultivation: Saving Water and Controlling Malaria
andJapanese Encephalitis?Wim van der Hoek, R. Sakthivadivel, Melanie Renshaw,
John B. Silver, Martin H. Birley, and  Flemming Konradsen, 2000.
48. Predicting Water Availability in Irrigation Tank Cascade Systems: The CASCADE
Water Balance Model. C. J. Jayatilaka, R. Sakthivadivel, Y. Shinogi, I. W. Makin,
and P. Witharana, 2000.
49. Basin-Level Use and Productivity of Water: Examples from South Asia. David
Molden, R. Sakthivadivel, and Zaigham Habib, 2000.
50. Modeling Scenarios for Water Allocation in the Gediz Basin, Turkey. Geoff Kite,
Peter Droogers, Hammond Murray-Rust, and Koos de Voogt, 2001.
51. Valuing Water in Irrigated Agriculture and Reservoir Fisheries: A  Multiple Use
Irrigation System in Sri Lanka. Mary E. Renwick, 2001.
52. Charging for Irrigation Water: The Issues and Options, with a Cast Study from Iran.
C. J. Perry, 2001.
53. Estimating Productivity of Water at Different Spatial Scales Using Simulation
Modeling. Peter Droogers, and Geoff Kite, 2001.
54. Wells and Welfare in the Ganga Basin: Public Policy and Private Initiative in Eastern
Uttar Pradesh, India. Tushaar Shah, 2001.
55.Water Scarcity and Managing Seasonal Water Crisis: Lessons from the Kirindi Oya
Project in Sri Lanka.  R. Sakthivadivel, Ronald Loeve, Upali A. Amarasinghe,




R. Sakthivadivel, Ronald Loeve, Upali A. Amarasinghe 
and Manju Hemakumara 
Water Scarcity and Managing Seasonal Water 




IWMI is a Future Harvest Center
supported by the CGIAR
Postal Address:
P O Box 2075
Colombo
Sri Lanka
Location:
127, Sunil Mawatha
Pelawatta
Battaramulla
Sri Lanka
Tel:
+94-1-867404
Fax:
+94-1-866854
E-mail:
iwmi@cgiar.org
Website:
http://www.iwmi.org
ISSN 1026-0862
ISBN 92-9090-444-5
Water Management
International
Institute